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Framework for Detention and Targeting Outside the “Hot” Conflict Zone, 161 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1165 (2013). 
INTRODUCTION 
The recent release of the United States Department of Justice White 
Paper, detailing the legal justifications for the targeted killing of American 
citizens overseas in the course of U.S. counterterrorism operations against 
al Qaeda and associated forces, 1  provides an interesting and important 
backdrop for any discussion of key legal issues that arise in the context of 
these U.S. operations. The memo poses and answers (or sometimes merely 
alludes to) a host of questions, including who may be targeted, how they 
may be targeted, when such strikes are lawful, and, most relevant here, 
where targeted strikes—and other incidents of wartime authority—may be 
employed. This last question lies at the heart of Professor Jennifer Daskal’s 
 
† Director, International Humanitarian Law Clinic, Emory University School of Law. I 
would like to thank the Editors of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review for the gracious 
invitation to publish this Response to Professor Jennifer Daskal’s thought-provoking and engaging 
Article. 
1 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LAWFULNESS OF A LETHAL OPERATION DIRECTED AGAINST A 
U.S. CITIZEN WHO IS A SENIOR OPERATIONAL LEADER OF AL-QA’IDA OR AN ASSOCI-
ATED FORCE 1-2 (2011), available at http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/020413_ 
DOJ_White_Paper.pdf. 
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recent Article, The Geography of the Battlefield: A Framework for Detention and 
Targeting Outside the “Hot” Conflict Zone,2 which proposes a new law of war 
framework for targeting and detention operations that rests on a distinction 
between areas of ongoing hostilities and areas more attenuated from such 
“hot” battlefields. The issue of the geography of “the battlefield”—that is, 
where an armed conflict can and does take place—has provoked extensive 
debates over the past few years. Daskal’s Article offers a useful and thought-
ful addition to the discourse, highlighting some of the key interests and 
challenges at the heart of the matter. 
Two central concerns, however, arise from the prospective application of 
Daskal’s suggested legal framework: (1) how the lack of strategic clarity 
trickles down to affect operational and tactical clarity, and (2) the long-term 
consequences for the development and implementation of the law of armed 
conflict (LOAC). This Response highlights these concerns as a counter-
point to the idea of a new set of rules based on shifting geographical combat 
zones, even in light of the potential procedural benefits such new rules and 
frameworks might engender. In essence, it is important to recognize that 
LOAC’s constituents, as it were, include not only the strategic and policy-
level decisionmakers and the suspected enemy operatives they seek to 
combat, but also the individual soldiers tasked with carrying out the mission 
and, in a broader sense, all those who will implement LOAC in the future 
or employ its authorities and benefit from its protections. Exploring and 
accounting for the purposes and functionality of LOAC from all angles is 
therefore a critical aspect of any discussion of LOAC’s applicability with 
regard to either geographical application or the formulation of situation-
dependent rules or parameters. Indeed, the application of LOAC—where 
and when it applies, and how it applies to different categories of persons 
and objects—is fundamental not only to the execution of military opera-
tions, but also to the planning of and training for operations, and to the 
enforcement of accountability for violations of the law. Divorcing consider-
ations of LOAC’s geographical reach or its applications in different geo-
graphical areas from these three components thus introduces substantial 
concerns about feasibility, operational effectiveness and predictability, and 
risks severing the debate from LOAC’s fundamental purposes and objec-
tives. Lost in the current discourse as well is the fact that “armed conflict” is 
a legal term of art, one introduced to avoid the political manipulations 
 
2 Jennifer C. Daskal, The Geography of the Battlefield: A Framework for Detention and Targeting 
Outside the “Hot” Conflict Zone, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1165 (2013).  
12 Blank Final.docx (DO NOT DELETE)  8/9/2013 8:51 PM 
2013] Operational Aspects of the Geography of Conflict Debate 349 
enabled by the earlier use of the word “war,”3 while “battlefield” is an 
operational euphemism for the place where armed hostilities are taking place 
and does not even appear as a defined term in military doctrine.4 And yet 
“armed conflict” and “battlefield” have become linked and have even begun to 
morph into a legal conception of the “battlefield” that is not based in LOAC, 
which does not provide specific geographic parameters for armed conflict. 
Part I of this Response briefly highlights the core principles and purposes 
of LOAC as an essential backdrop to any discussion of LOAC’s applicabil-
ity (both the “where” question and the “how” question). Part II then 
explores the consequences of using a rules-based framework to answer, or 
perhaps sidestep, the challenging question of where the bounds of conflict 
with transnational actors may lie, focusing on issues of clarity and predicta-
bility and the long-term development of the law. The question of geograph-
ical application of LOAC is both highly relevant in the most pragmatic 
sense—the difference between being in an area of armed conflict or not 
literally can be life or death—and also not susceptible to specific and 
concrete definition. This combination of relevance and thorniness has led 
not only to extensive debates about how to conceptualize the geographic 
parameters of the battlespace in an armed conflict,5 but also to alternative 
paradigms for regulating the use of force through rules-based frameworks, 
 
3 See OSCAR M. UHLER ET AL., INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, IV GENEVA CON-
VENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR: 
COMMENTARY �� (Jean S. Pictet ed., Ronald Griffin & C.W. Dumbleton trans., ����) (“The 
substitution of this much more general expression for the word ‘war’ was deliberate. It is possible 
to argue almost endlessly about the legal definition of ‘war’. . . . The expression ‘armed conflict’ 
makes such arguments less easy.”). 
4 The closest term in the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms is 
“theater of war,” which is “[d]efined by the President, Secretary of Defense, or the geographic 
combatant commander as the area of air, land, and water that is, or may become, directly involved 
in the conduct of major operations and campaigns involving combat.” JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, 
JOINT PUBL’N 1-02, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCI-
ATED TERMS 292 (2013), available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf. 
5 See, e.g., KENNETH ANDERSON, HOOVER INST., TARGETED KILLING AND DRONE 
WARFARE: HOW WE CAME TO DEBATE WHETHER THERE IS A ‘LEGAL GEOGRAPHY OF 
WAR’ 10-16 (2011), available at http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/ 
FutureChallenges_Anderson.pdf; Louise Arimatsu, Territory, Boundaries and the Law of Armed 
Conflict, 12 Y.B. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 157, 178-82, 187-92 (2009); Laurie R. Blank, Defining 
the Battlefield in Contemporary Conflict and Counterterrorism: Understanding the Parameters of the Zone 
of Combat, 39 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 14-�� (����); Geoffrey S. Corn, Geography of Armed 
Conflict: Why it Is a Mistake to Fish for the Red Herring, 89 INT’L L. STUD. 77, 86-92 (2013); 
Michael W. Lewis, Drones and the Boundaries of the Battlefield, 47 TEX. INT’L L.J. 293, 301-08 
(2012); Noam Lubell & Nathan Derejko, A Global Battlefield? Drones and the Geographical Scope of 
Armed Conflict, 11 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 65, 68-73 (2013); Mary Ellen O’Connell, Combatants and 
the Combat Zone, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 845, 858-59 (2009); WHAT IS WAR?: AN INVESTIGA-
TION IN THE WAKE OF 9/11 (Mary Ellen O’Connell ed., 2012).  
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hybrid paradigms, or other mechanisms, such as those Daskal proposes. 
Although these alternative conceptions of the battlefield are highly useful, it 
is also important to address their feasibility in the operational realm and 
their potential second- and third-order effects. 
I. LOAC’S PRINCIPLES AND PARAMETERS  
IN THE BATTLEFIELD DEBATE 
LOAC—otherwise known as the law of war or international humanitarian 
law—governs the conduct of both states and individuals during armed 
conflict. It seeks to minimize suffering in war by protecting persons not 
participating in hostilities and by restricting the means and methods of 
warfare.6 LOAC applies during all situations of armed conflict, with the full 
panoply of the Geneva Conventions and customary law applicable in 
international armed conflict and a more limited body of conventional and 
customary law applicable during non-international armed conflict.7 In all 
circumstances, therefore, LOAC provides the basic framework for all 
actions, obligations, and privileges; it is, in essence, the outer parameters for 
all military conduct. 
LOAC has multiple purposes that all stem from or contribute to the 
regulation of the conduct of hostilities and the protection of persons and 
objects affected by conflict. The most obvious, perhaps, is the humanitarian 
purpose, the focus on protecting persons who are caught up in the horrors 
of war. Equally important, however, is the regulation of the means and 
methods of warfare for the direct purpose of protecting those who are 
 
6  INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, ADVISORY SERV. ON INT’L HUMANITARIAN 
LAW, WHAT IS INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW? 1 (2004), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/what_is_ihl.pdf. The law of armed conflict is codified 
primarily in the four Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 and their Additional Protocols. See 
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter First Geneva 
Convention]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and 
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 
[hereinafter Second Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva 
Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention]; Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June �, ����, ���� U.N.T.S. � [hereinafter 
Additional Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June �, 
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609. 
7 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 6, at 1.  
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fighting—soldiers and others—from unnecessary suffering during conflict. 
Finally, it is crucial to recognize that the law of war does not exist to inhibit 
military operations or prevent war; rather, the goal of this body of law is to 
enable effective, moral, and lawful military operations within the parame-
ters of the two aforementioned protective purposes.8  
The Geneva Conventions, and the laws of war for centuries before that, 
are based on four key principles: military necessity, humanity, distinction, 
and proportionality.9 These key principles of LOAC not only provide the 
foundation for the law, but can also serve as a useful guidepost for exploring 
difficult challenges and finding solutions that preserve and protect the law’s 
core values. Military necessity recognizes that the goal of war is the com-
plete submission of the enemy as quickly as possible; it allows any force 
necessary to achieve that goal as long as not forbidden by the law.10 The 
principle of humanity aims to minimize suffering in armed conflict; the 
infliction of suffering not necessary for legitimate military purposes is 
therefore forbidden.11 The principle of distinction requires all parties in a 
conflict to distinguish between those who are fighting and those who are not 
and target only the former when launching attacks.12 Finally, the principle 
of proportionality seeks to balance military goals with the protection of 
civilians, prohibiting attacks when the expected civilian casualties will be 
excessive compared to the anticipated military advantage.13  
In the context of the geography of armed conflict, military necessity and 
humanity might help provide guidance in delineating the scope of the 
battlefield. Military necessity naturally suggests a broad view of the zone of 
combat in order to offer the most comprehensive opportunity to defeat the 
enemy. At first glance, the principle of humanity seems to support a broad 
 
8 See id. at 1-2. 
9 U.K. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, JSP 383, THE JOINT SERVICE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF 
ARMED CONFLICT ¶¶ 2.1-2.6.3 (2004), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/ 
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/�����/JSP�������Edition.pdf; see also U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
ARMY, FIELD MANUAL NO. 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE app. A-1 (1956), available at 
http://www.afsc.army.mil/gc/files/fm��-10.pdf. 
10 U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, supra note 9, at app. A-1. 
11 See Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Preamble, July 
29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803 (the “Martens Clause”); LAURIE R. BLANK & GREGORY P. NOONE, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT: FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND 
CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES IN THE LAW OF WAR 41-43 (2013). 
12 Article 48 of Additional Protocol I sets forth what is known as the “basic rule”: “In order 
to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to 
the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and 
between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only 
against military objectives.” Additional Protocol I, supra note 6, art. 48. 
13 See id. arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii), 57(2)(b). 
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view of the geographical scope of armed conflict as well. The Commentary 
to the Fourth Geneva Convention emphasizes that the drafters sought to 
ensure the “widest possible field of application” for LOAC’s protective 
goals.14 In the past, this goal of maximizing protection has been a driving 
force, facilitating interpretations of complicated questions regarding 
protected persons or other issues.15 In the context of conflicts with terrorist 
groups, however, this goal may not operate as effectively. Simply put, 
taking a broad view of the time and space dimensions in a conflict with 
terrorist groups could—with little imagination—lead one to conclude that a 
large portion of the world falls within the zone of combat, by dint of 
terrorist groups having a presence in many countries and terrorist attacks 
taking place in many countries. Although this approach would, in theory, 
mean that large numbers of persons might benefit from the rights and 
protections of LOAC, it also means that large swaths of the globe would fall 
within the “use of force as first resort” authority—against positively identi-
fied enemy operatives only—that LOAC grants to belligerents.16 Thus, the 
principle of humanity more rationally supports a narrow view of the 
geographic scope of conflict in this situation, a view that seeks to protect the 
most people by keeping conflict, and the battlefield, away from their 
countries altogether.  
This result—a broad view of geographical application based on military 
necessity and a narrow view based on humanity—mirrors in some ways 
LOAC’s essential and inherent balancing of military necessity and humanity 
and ultimately leaves lingering uncertainties about how to frame the 
geographic scope of the battlefield. And yet, as discussed further in Section 
II.A, this inherent tension between military necessity and humanity, 
 
14 OSCAR M. UHLER ET AL., supra note 3, at 50. 
15 The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’s (ICTY) approach in 
Prosecutor v. Tadic and other cases, which bases protected person status on allegiance rather than 
nationality, fulfills LOAC’s general need for broad applicability across territory, time, and 
categories of persons. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement, ¶166 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/tad-
aj990715e.pdf (holding, with an eye to ensuring fidelity to LOAC’s object and purpose, that 
allegiance, not nationality, should determine protected person status in the complex conflict in the 
former Yugoslavia).  
16 See Laurie R. Blank, Targeted Strikes: The Consequences of Blurring the Armed Conflict and 
Self-Defense Justifications, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1655, 1656-57, 1681 (2012); Geoffrey S. 
Corn, Laurie R. Blank, Chris Jenks & Eric Talbot Jensen, Belligerent Targeting and the Invalidity of 
a Least Harmful Means Rule, 89 INT’L L. STUD. 536, 550 (2013); Geoffrey Corn, Mixing Apples and 
Hand Grenades: The Logical Limit of Applying Human Rights Norms to Armed Conflict, 1 J. INT’L 
HUMANITARIAN LEGAL STUD. 52, 74-84 (2010). 
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between authority and obligation, raises important cautions about attempts 
to delineate the contours of that balance more specifically. That is, our 
discomfort with a lack of geographical clarity in a conflict between a state 
and a transnational terrorist group may well be precisely the source of the 
elasticity needed to enable this balance between military necessity and 
humanity to be sustained in pursuit of LOAC’s core purposes. 
II. OPERATIONAL CLARITY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW: 
CASUALTIES OF A HYBRID RULES-BASED FRAMEWORK 
As Daskal aptly describes, the primary contours of the debate over the 
scope of the battlefield are shaped by the territorially prescribed view on 
one side and the broadly conceived “global battlefield” on the other.17 From 
a policy standpoint, the latter poses the risk of spiraling violence and a 
degradation of sovereignty; the former offers terrorists and other armed 
groups an unnecessary bonus of safe haven simply by crossing an interna-
tional border. In an earlier piece, I have argued for a middle ground, based 
on an understanding of the relevant legal parameters that can offer guidance 
in analyzing the geographic space of conflict.18 In this sense, I firmly agree 
with the motivation behind Daskal’s effort to transcend the “impasse” 
seemingly created by a dichotomous, all-or-nothing view of the geography 
of conflict. However, attempting to navigate these thorny questions 
through new binding legal frameworks that copy and borrow from two or 
more distinct legal regimes poses a separate set of concerns, with the risk of 
more comprehensive long-term consequences.  
This Part highlights two of these concerns, specifically within the con-
text of one overarching question: would a new law of war framework apply 
only to conflicts with terrorist groups or to all LOAC-triggering situations? 
To the extent that this new framework would become the dominant frame-
work for all conflict situations, the operational and law-development 
concerns discussed in this Part loom large. However, if the new framework 
were to apply only in the event of conflicts like that between the U.S. and 
al Qaeda—a conflict between a state and a transnational terrorist group—
two equally significant questions arise. First, how—and by whom—would 
the determination be made as to whether a particular conflict situation fits 
 
17 See Daskal, supra note 2, at 1174-�� (describing and highlighting the flawed reasoning of 
both the substantively and territorially broad view and the territorially restricted view). I also have 
discussed these differing views in prior work. See Blank, supra note 5, at 20-26 (contrasting the 
global battlefield view with the spatially limited conception of the battlefield in the context of 
today’s conflicts with terrorist groups). 
18 See Blank, supra note 5, at 26-36. 
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within the regular LOAC framework or the new rules-based framework? 
The risk of additional layers of complexity, legal challenge, and uncertainty 
as a result of having to make this additional determination first would be 
great and poses a significant concern. Second, would there thus be two 
different standards for training and for enforcement, depending on the 
framework under which a particular unit was operating? Here the conse-
quences for clarity and predictability are quite simply enormous. 
A. Operational Clarity and Predictability 
A central focus of debate for more than a decade has been how to apply 
LOAC to conflicts with terrorist groups—from how to define the conflict to 
how to implement the principle of distinction to the content of law of war 
detention. The very application of LOAC to military operations against 
terrorist operatives or groups depends, as the essential preliminary consid-
eration, on the existence of an armed conflict. 19  Notwithstanding the 
complexities of these determinations in the context of efforts to combat 
transnational terrorist groups, LOAC continues to rely on clear and objec-
tive standards to assess when the law applies. Effective implementation of 
LOAC depends on the clarity of the legal principles, their application 
during the heat of battle, and their credible application post hoc in investi-
gations and prosecutions. Moreover, commanders and their troops can best 
adhere to the law and carry out its central tenets when the law and the 
obligations it imposes are predictable and operationally logical.  
The introduction of a new law of war framework for certain types of 
conflicts—in which the application of relevant rules depends not on estab-
lished standards but on a new set of considerations drawn from multiple 
legal regimes—will affect the application of LOAC at all levels: training, 
implementation, and enforcement. First, a new framework will have 
implications for training generally, but the implications go well beyond the 
need to develop new training methods and modules. Rather, the military 
will have to explore and assess how to train commanders, lawyers, and 
troops to comply with a legal framework based on a more complex set of 
considerations than that established by LOAC, including factors drawn 
from U.S. constitutional law and other international law regimes. At this 
stage of training and planning, another challenge will be that of drafting 
 
19 See Common Articles 2 and 3 of the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Geneva Conven-
tions, supra note 6 (setting forth the primary framework for LOAC applicability to situations of 
both international and non-international armed conflict). 
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and implementing rules of engagement for operations governed by the legal 
standards at issue here. Rules of engagement (ROE) distill law, strategy, 
and policy into tactical instructions for military personnel regarding when 
and against whom they can use force.20 LOAC forms the outer boundaries 
of lawfulness for conduct during armed conflict and thus is the outer 
framework for the rules of engagement; each military operation then has 
specifically designed rules of engagement to meet the operation’s particular 
needs. At one level, a new framework based on different legal obligations in 
different geographical locales does not have significant consequences for the 
development of ROE because there can be many specific considerations in 
any conflict situation that drive particularized ROE. Nonetheless, the 
rapidly changing nature of a conflict with terrorist groups—the nature and 
geographical location of the threat, and the available responses—will mean 
that the parameters of this new framework will also be changing—a recipe 
for extraordinary challenges with regard to developing and training for 
effective ROE. 
Second, implementation in the context of a new law of war framework 
as proposed, based on distinctions between various zones of security needs 
and the shifting procedural obligations that result, poses even more signifi-
cant concerns. Pragmatically, threat and the concomitant need to respond to 
that threat will always be the primary consideration driving the strategic, 
operational, and tactical calculus: “Armed conflict is a threat-driven con-
cept, arising when the threat necessitates resort to combat power, and 
extending to wherever the operational and tactical opportunity to produce a 
militarily valuable effect on the enemy arises.”21 Divorcing a geographic 
 
20 See INT’L & OPERATIONAL LAW DEP’T, JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN.’S LEGAL CTR. & 
SCH., OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 73-74 (Brian Bill & Jeremy Marsh eds., 2010), available 
at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/operational-law-handbook_2010.pdf (defining rules 
of engagement and describing their purposes); JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, supra note 4, at 249-50 
(defining rules of engagement); Richard J. Grunawalt, The JCS Standing Rules of Engagement: A 
Judge Advocate's Primer, 42 A.F. L. REV. 245, 246-47 (1997) (discussing the history and function of 
rules of engagement). For further discussion of rules of engagement, see Laurie R. Blank, Rules of 
Engagement: Law, Strategy, and Leadership, in ASPECTS OF LEADERSHIP: ETHICS, LAW, AND 
SPIRITUALITY 221 (Carroll Connelley & Paolo Tripodi eds., 2012), and INT’L INST. OF 
HUMANITARIAN LAW, RULES OF ENGAGEMENT HANDBOOK 6 (2009), available at 
http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/7b0d0f70-bb07-48f2-af0a-7474e92d0bb0/San-Remo-ROE-
Handbook, which explains, “In addition to self-defence, ROE will therefore generally reflect 
multiple components, including political guidance from higher authorities, the tactical considera-
tions of the specific mission, and LOAC. Succinct and unambiguous rules are essential.” 
21 Corn, supra note 5, at ��. The U.S. military’s concept of “effects-based operations” illus-
trates this directly: the desired strategic, operational, and tactical effects drive the military 
mission, and these effects are in turn dictated by threat capabilities, dispositions, and vulnerabili-
ties. See, e.g., Robert B. Herndon, John A. Robinson, James L. Creighton, Raphael Torres & Louis 
J. Bello, Effects-Based Operations in Afghanistan: The CJTF-180 Method of Orchestrating Effects to 
 
12 Blank Final.docx (DO NOT DELETE)8/9/2013 8:51 PM 
356 University of Pennsylvania Law Review Online [Vol. 161: 347 
 
analysis from this fundamental nature of military operations and deci-
sionmaking can make the law less practical in the immediate sense, and can 
also, as explained below, hinder the development of the law going forward. 
During military operations, the law plays an essential protective role not 
only for those uninvolved in the conflict, but—just as importantly—for 
those who are fighting.22 Beyond specific provisions that protect soldiers, 
sailors, airmen, and Marines (such as the obligation to care for the wound-
ed,23 the prohibition on weapons that cause superfluous injury,24 and the 
protections provided for prisoners of war25), the law accomplishes this key 
purpose by striving for clarity and predictability. At the most basic level, 
soldiers need to know when and against whom they can use force. Uncer-
tainty regarding that most fundamental aspect of wartime conduct places an 
extraordinary burden on the soldier and places him or her in grave danger 
beyond that already inherent in the nature of conflict. It may well be 
possible that a new law of war framework with binding rules that depend on 
a security calculus drawn from different geographic zones can offer more 
guidance for a policymaker or other decisionmaker at the highest strategic 
level. For the men and women directly facing the enemy, however, it 
muddies the waters by introducing additional considerations to the tactical 
and operational decisionmaking process, a process that is measured in 
seconds, if not less.26  
More broadly, the balance between military necessity and humanity, 
highlighted in Part I, is most vital in the direct implementation of LOAC 
during military operations. Military necessity provides the authority for a 
 
Achieve Objectives, FIELD ARTILLERY, Jan.-Feb. 2004, at 26, available at http://sill-
www.army.mil/firesbulletin/archives/����/JAN_FEB_2004/JAN_FEB_2004_FULL_EDITION.p
df (analyzing effects-based operations, “[a] process for obtaining a desired strategic outcome or 
‘effect’ on the enemy through the synergistic, multiplicative and cumulative application of the full 
range of military and nonmilitary capabilities” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
22 See generally First Geneva Convention, supra note 6 (protecting wounded and sick mem-
bers of the armed forces on land); Second Geneva Convention, supra note 6 (protecting wounded, 
sick, and shipwrecked members of the armed forces at sea); Third Geneva Convention, supra note 
6 (protecting prisoners of war). 
23 See, e.g., First Geneva Convention, supra note 6, art. 12(1) (“Members of the armed forces 
and other persons mentioned in the following Article, who are wounded or sick, shall be respected 
and protected in all circumstances.”). 
24 See, e.g., Additional Protocol I, supra note 6, art. 35(2) (“It is prohibited to employ weap-
ons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or 
unnecessary suffering.”). 
25 See, e.g., Third Geneva Convention, supra note 6. 
26 See generally Laurie Blank & Amos Guiora, Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks: Operationaliz-
ing the Law of Armed Conflict in New Warfare, 1 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 45, 53-54 (2010) 
(describing the characteristics of “new warfare”). 
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party to a conflict to use all force—within the bounds of the law—necessary 
to achieve the complete submission of the enemy.27 This authority extends 
beyond the neutralization or elimination of immediate threats to the 
broader purpose of defeating the enemy as an entity itself, rather than the 
individuals who comprise the enemy force. For this reason, the law envi-
sions a robust and broad power to attack and disable the enemy based on 
the presumption that, by nature of being part of the enemy, all members of 
the enemy force pose a threat.28 ROE then provide parameters for and 
limits on that power in some situations, depending on the strategic, politi-
cal, and operational needs of the mission at hand.29 If the law would now be 
relied upon to provide those parameters—as seems to be the effect of 
proposed law of war frameworks such as that which Daskal suggests—the 
law would apply differently in different conflicts and in different geographic 
areas related to the same conflict. Operationally, this effect has the potential 
to be a recipe for uncertainty and unpredictability, and divorces legal 
authority from operational practice and necessity. No less, such a frame-
work raises the question of how the decisions are to be made regarding 
where different authorities can be used and where different procedural 
 
27 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, supra note 9, at app. A-1. 
28 In an international armed conflict, all members of the military forces of a party to the 
conflict are legitimate targets of attack at all times; in a non-international armed conflict, all 
fighters in an organized armed group that is a party to the conflict are similarly targetable at all 
times. See JIMMY GURULÉ & GEOFFREY S. CORN, PRINCIPLES OF COUNTER-TERRORISM 
LAW 70-76 (2011) (discussing the rules governing targeting of enemy forces in international and 
non-international armed conflict and noting that (�) “a member of an enemy force . . . is 
presumed hostile and therefore presumptively subject to attack” in international armed conflict, 
and (2) “[s]ubjecting members of organized belligerent groups to status based targeting pursuant 
to the LOAC as opposed to civilians who periodically lose their protection from attack seems both 
logical and consistent with the practice of states engaged in non-international armed conflicts”); 
Nils Melzer, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law, 90 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 991, 995 (2008) (stating that members of 
organized armed groups are targetable based on their status in non-international armed conflict). 
29 For example, the United States has drastically limited the use of air power in Afghanistan 
in order to reduce civilian casualties as much as possible, a limit that serves the strategic goals of 
the mission but is not mandated by LOAC, which would likely permit the use of air strikes in 
many more situations (dependent on adherence to the principles of distinction, proportionality, 
and precautions, and other obligations inherent in the law of targeting). See, e.g., Hearing to 
Consider the Nominations of Admiral James G. Stavridis, USN for Reappointment to the Grade of 
Admiral and to Be Commander, U.S. European Command and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe; 
Lieutenant General Douglas M. Fraser, USAF to Be General and Commander, U.S. Southern Command; 
and Lieutenant General Stanley A. McChrystal, USA to Be General and Commander, International 
Security Assistance Force and Commander, U.S. Forces, Afghanistan Before the S. Comm. on Armed 
Servs., 111th Cong. 11 (2009) (statement of Lt. Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal) (“Our willingness to 
operate in ways that minimize casualties or damage, even when doing so makes our task more 
difficult, is essential to our credibility.”).  
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obligations must be fulfilled, all the while recognizing that conflict is a fluid 
and shifting environment, driven by threat perception, operational needs, 
the conduct of the enemy, and a range of other factors. 
Third, the enforcement and accountability stage of conflict introduces 
similar challenges as a result of the interaction of a new law of war frame-
work with operational needs during conflict. Accountability for legal 
violations during armed conflict is an essential component of ensuring 
LOAC compliance, thus maximizing the law’s ability to protect civilians 
and others hors de combat and to ensure humane treatment, among other 
goals. Over the past few decades, the remarkable development of an 
international criminal jurisprudence—through the work of ad hoc tribunals, 
hybrid tribunals, and the International Criminal Court, among other 
mechanisms—has demonstrated the vital role that accountability plays in 
enforcing the law, in bringing justice to the victims, and, in some cases, in 
helping to promote reconciliation. The application of the law in the court-
room, however, must be operationally relevant in order to serve as a useful 
guide for commanders in future military operations. If it is not, the likeli-
hood that the law will be seen as irrelevant or too hard to follow is unfortu-
nately far too great and is a serious concern.30 
In the specific context of a law of war framework designed to incorpo-
rate additional procedural guarantees and legal regimes in addressing 
targeting and detention issues across a range of geographic spaces in a 
transnational conflict, these accountability challenges will loom even larger. 
First, the relevant legal obligations will be based not only on LOAC but on 
additional legal regimes as well, such as human rights law or domestic 
constitutional law, for example. Second, the nature of those obligations and 
the way in which the various legal regimes relate to each other within this 
new law of war paradigm will change depending on where, geographically, 
the relevant conduct takes place. And, as noted above, the lines between 
geographic areas that drive different legal obligations are not fixed during a 
 
30 The criticisms of the ICTY trial judgment in the case of Prosecutor v. Gotovina highlight 
these risks with regard to both the development and implementation of LOAC in the future and 
the institutional consequences for the military. See INT’L HUMANITARIAN LAW CLINIC AT 
EMORY UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, OPERATIONAL LAW EXPERTS ROUNDTABLE ON THE 
GOTOVINA JUDGMENT: MILITARY OPERATIONS, BATTLEFIELD REALITY AND THE 
JUDGMENT’S IMPACT ON EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 7, 10-15 (2012) (discussing ways in which the Trial 
Chamber’s judgment in Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Case No. IT-06-90-T, Judgement (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 15, 2011), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/gotovina/tjug/en/ 
110415_judgement_vol1.pdf, could have proved detrimental to the military’s ability to conduct 
lawful operations and protect civilians). 
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conflict with a transnational actor, but rather will shift in accordance with 
the nature of the threat, the state’s response, and other factors. Current 
cases before the military commissions in the United States already demon-
strate the jurisdictional hurdles posed by a conflict whose geographic and 
temporal parameters are difficult to identify; 31  these challenges will be 
magnified exponentially if different components of the same conflict trigger 
different legal obligations as a result of a new framework based on a sliding 
scale of procedural obligations relative to geographical location and other 
factors. Furthermore, enforcement of LOAC always helps to guide future 
decisionmaking by commanders, judge advocates, and others, but the nature 
of an accountability process in this new law of war framework will unfortu-
nately not foster greater clarity and predictability. Which precedents would 
apply in which areas, and for how long? Military commanders and other 
decisionmakers would be left with the unenviable task of sorting through 
the uncertainty of the legal precedents and judgments or might simply 
disregard these precedents as not applicable, an equally problematic out-
come. As a result, even when a new framework offers the apparent potential 
for greater procedural protections or other metrics of effectiveness, if it 
divorces the decisionmaking and, later, the enforcement process from the 
operational realities of military operations, it is likely to be viewed as 
irrelevant or, still worse, as doing more harm than good. 
B. Consequences for the Continued Development of LOAC 
Uncertainty about the geographic scope of armed conflict leads to a variety 
of analytical and implementation challenges with regard to LOAC, human 
rights law, jus ad bellum, and other relevant legal regimes. The simple fact 
that within an armed conflict, a party to the conflict can use lethal force as a 
first resort, while outside an armed conflict, such deadly force may only be 
used as a last resort, is the starkest reminder of why such extensive attention 
has been focused on this question over the past few years. For the purpose 
of achieving LOAC’s central goal of “alleviating, as much as possible the 
 
31 For example, in the Al-Nashiri case, the government and the defense are engaged in exten-
sive motion practice regarding when the conflict with al Qaeda started, for the purpose of 
determining the Commission’s jurisdiction over certain charged crimes, namely, the bombing of 
the U.S.S. Cole. See, e.g., Order on Defense Motion to Dismiss Because the Convening Authority 
Exceeded his Power in Referring this Case to a Military Commission at 6, United States v. Al-
Nashiri (Mil. Comm’n Guantanamo Bay, Jan. 15, 2013) (denying without prejudice the defense’s 
motion to dismiss). 
12 Blank Final.docx (DO NOT DELETE)8/9/2013 8:51 PM 
360 University of Pennsylvania Law Review Online [Vol. 161: 347 
 
calamities of war,”32 greater clarity regarding where an armed conflict is 
taking place and to where the concomitant authorities and obligations 
extend certainly would be a significant contribution. The international 
community—military lawyers, policymakers, international law scholars—
should therefore address these issues head-on in a continuing effort to 
better understand how to apply the law most effectively and efficiently.33 
Daskal’s proposal for a rules-driven new law of war framework is therefore a 
welcome and important contribution to the discussion and debate. At the 
same time, however, these efforts must stay true to the needs and goals of 
LOAC as a pragmatic, operationally focused body of law that is, above all, 
designed to work in the inherent chaos and uncertainty of armed conflict. 
As I have argued elsewhere, there are significant risks for the future imple-
mentation and development of LOAC as a result of conflating norms from 
LOAC with norms from human rights law, or of borrowing one from the 
other without careful delineation, including, in particular, the rules regarding 
surrender and capture and the different applications and purposes of propor-
tionality in each legal regime.34 No place is this risk more profound than in 
relation to the legal authority to employ force against an enemy belligerent. 
In the context of a specific legal framework for one particular type of 
conflict, the same concerns about blurring the lines between legal regimes 
remain. LOAC does not require an individualized threat assessment in the 
targeting of combatants, who are presumed hostile by dint of their status. 
Over time, however, the requirement for an individualized threat assess-
ment in certain geographical zones in a new law of war framework for 
conflicts with transnational terrorist groups may well begin to bleed into the 
application of LOAC in more traditional conflicts. In essence, therefore, a 
carefully designed paradigm for one complex and difficult conflict scenario 
ultimately impacts LOAC writ large, even absent any perceived need or 
direct motivation for such change. Interpreting LOAC to require an 
individualized threat assessment for all targeting decisions—even those 
against the regular armed forces of the enemy state in an international 
 
32 Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 
Grammes Weight, Dec. 11, 1868, reprinted in 1 AM. J. INT’L L. SUPP. 95, 95 (1907) (commonly 
referred to as the St. Petersburg Declaration). 
33 See Blank, supra note 16, at 1699-700 (arguing that the “[f]ailure to engage directly with the 
tough issues that lie at the heart of the distinction between where a state is acting as part of an 
armed conflict and where it is acting solely in legitimate self-defense against a terrorist or other 
threat is, ultimately, a wasted opportunity to promote greater development in the law going 
forward”). 
34 See id. at 1697-700. 
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armed conflict—introduces significant tactical and operational risk for 
soldiers not mandated or envisioned by the law.35 The same conflation 
problem holds true for other non-LOAC obligations that might be imported 
into LOAC depending on the analysis of where and how a new law of war 
framework were to apply. It is important to recognize, notwithstanding the 
focus on the operational effectiveness of LOAC in this Response, that 
conflation and “borrowing” offer the same challenges for the implementa-
tion of human rights law, to the extent that norms from LOAC begin to 
bleed into the application of human rights norms. Lastly, superimposing an 
artificially created framework detracts attention from—or even papers 
over—current challenges within LOAC, such as the identification of enemy 
operatives, the nature and amount of proof required for determinations of 
reasonableness or unreasonableness in targeting decisions, and other 
perennially tricky issues. 
CONCLUSION 
 The procedural and legal protections proposed in the sort of rules-based, 
geographically differentiated law of war framework that Daskal proposes 
could certainly maximize protections for certain groups of people in certain 
areas during certain specific conflicts. To that end, such enhanced protec-
tions would indeed be an important contribution. However, the operational 
imperatives of conflict—all conflicts, not only the complex current conflict 
with al Qaeda and associated terrorist groups—suggest that such a frame-
work would likely have more significant detrimental consequences through 
diminished clarity and predictability in the application of LOAC at all 
stages and unfortunate modifications in the future development of LOAC. 
Learning to accept some uncertainty in assessing the geography of conflict 
therefore helps to protect equally important LOAC goals and may well be a 
better option than it appears at first blush.  
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